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The Lingering Problem with the Specificity Test in
United States Countervailing Duty Law
Virtually every product and service moving in international
trade is affected by a government action that could be consid-
ered a subsidy in the broadest sense of the term.' Technically,
any government action, such as taxing, spending, or regulating,
that reduces a producer's costs below what they would be ab-
sent government intervention is a subsidy.2 Almost every in-
dustry and product benefits from some such government action.
Despite the ubiquity of subsidies, United States law3 and
international agreements 4 recognize that certain subsidies in
one country can injure industries in another country and that
the injured country may have the right to protection from the
harmful subsidy. Protection usually takes the form of a coun-
tervailing duty5 levied on an imported product to offset the sub-
sidy received by its producers.6  Both United States
countervailing duty law and the Subsidies Code,7 a multilateral
agreement negotiated under the auspices of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),8 take the view that a sub-
sidy specifically designed to increase exports from one country
1.. See Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834, 838
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
2. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
3. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat.
144, 150-89 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677g (1983 & Supp. IV 1986)).
4. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and
XXIH of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature,
Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619 [hereinafter Subsidies Code].
5. A countervailing duty is a tax on an import equal to the amount of the
net subsidy on that import. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2)(B) (1983 & Supp. IV 1986).
For example, in Certain Softwood Lumber Prods. from Can., 51 Fed. Reg.
37,453 (ITA 1986) (preliminary determination) (discussed infra note 50 and ac-
companying text), the Commerce Department's International Trade Adminis-
tration (ITA) found that Canada's sale of lumber-cutting rights to Canadian
lumber industries at less than market prices resulted in a subsidy of 14.542%
of the price of the lumber imported into the United States. Id. at 37,458. The
ITA thus recommended that a countervailing duty, or tax, of that amount be
placed on the lumber imported from Canada. Id. at 37,453.
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2)(B).
7. Supra note 4.
8. Opened for signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187.
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into others (an export subsidy) is unjustifiable.9 A subsidy cal-
culated primarily toward achieving a domestic policy objective
(a domestic subsidy), however, presents difficult legal and pol-
icy questions when it also indirectly causes injury to another
country's industry. The right to protection from injury must be
balanced against the realization that virtually every import-as
well as every export-has benefited from some form of domes-
tic subsidy.'0
Although the Subsidies Code presents no precise formula
to achieve this balance,"- United States law limits potential ac-
tions against domestic subsidies in part by defining subsidy nar-
rowly so that only certain kinds of government actions become
countervailable subsidies.'2 This Note argues that better re-
sults would follow from changing United States law to define
domestic subsidy broadly and using de rninimis limits on the
subsidy's size to exclude certain government practices from the
scope of protection. Part I of the Note summarizes the GATT
structure for dealing with subsidies and United States counter-
vailing duty law. Part II analyzes recent cases and bills and ar-
gues that the present law makes politically and economically
unreasonable distinctions. Part III proposes that adoption of a
new de minimis line would better meet the policy objectives
underlying the countervailing duty law.
I. THE TREATMENT OF SUBSIDIES UNDER THE
PRESENT LAW
A. GATT LAW AND UNITED STATES COUNTERVAILING
DUTY LAW
United States countervailing duty law is constrained by
United States obligations under the GATT Subsidies Code.' 3
The Code allows the individual signatory countries to enact
countervailing duties to offset the effects of both export and do-
mestic subsidies provided they find a subsidy, material injury,
and a causal link between the subsidy and the injury.' 4 The
Subsidies Code, however, does not precisely define subsidy.
9. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a, 1677(5)(1982 and Supp. IV 1986); Subsidies Code,
supra note 4, at Art. 9(1).
10. See Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722, 731-32 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985), appeal dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
11. See discussion of the Subsidies Code infra notes 13-19 and accompany-
ing text.
12. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
13. Supra note 4.
14. Id. at Art. 2(1).
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Further, although it gives examples of possible domestic subsi-
dies,'5 the Code does not suggest that these examples by them-
selves would constitute counterailable subsidies.16 The Code
also lists examples of export subsidies17 and prohibits their
use.18 Generally, this list describes government practices that
reward or otherwise favor exporters over producers for the do-
mestic market.
In addition to allowing the individual countries to pursue
their own countervailing duty actions within the broad limits
just described, the Subsidies Code sets up procedures whereby a
country claiming injury from another's subsidy may request
consultations and bring the dispute before a committee of the
GATT for resolution. 9
United States countervailing duty law20 authorizes the
15. Id. at Art. 11(3) (signatories recognize that objectives mentioned above
may be achieved, inter alia, by means of subsidies granted with aim of giving
advantage to certain enterprises; examples are government financing of com-
mercial enterprises, including grants, loans or guarantees; government provi-
sion or government financed provision of utility, supply distribution and other
operational or support services or facilities; government financing of research
and development programs; fiscal incentives; and government subscription to,
or provision of, equity capital).
16. Id. at Art. 11(4).
17. Id. at Art. 9. The Annex to the Subsidies Code, supra note 4, provides
an extensive list of examples of export subsidies. Id. at Annex. Some exam-
ples are: the provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or industry
contingent upon export performance; the provision of transport charges to ex-
port shipments at a more favorable rate than to domestic shipments; the provi-
sion of inputs to manufacturers of export products at favorable rates;
exemption from taxes or fees for exporters; the reduction of import charges
for inputs to export industries; and special export finance programs.
18. Id. at Art. 9.
19. Id. at Art. 12-13. Because export subsidies are prohibited under the
Code, id. at Art. 9, a country may invoke the GATT dispute settlement proce-
dures whenever it "has reason to believe that an export subsidy is being
granted or maintained by another signatory .... ." Id. at Art. 12(1). Domestic
subsidies are not prohibited, and a country may invoke the dispute settlement
procedures only when it has reason to believe that the subsidy either causes
injury, nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to it under GATT, or causes seri-
ous prejudice to its interests. Id. at Art. 12(3).
20. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677g (1983 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 1671(a) reads
as follows:
(a) General rule.
If-
(1) the administering authority determines that-
(A) a country under the Agreement, or
(B) a person who is a citizen or national of such
country, or a corporation, association, or other organiza-
tion organized in such a country,
is providing, directly or indirectly, a subsidy with respect to the
19881 1161
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Commerce Department's International Trade Administration
(ITA) to determine whether a country is subsidizing a product
imported into the United States and the amount of the sub-
sidy.21 If the ITA finds a subsidy, the International Trade Com-
mission (ITC) decides whether the subsidy has materially
injured the American producer.22 If the ITC finds material in-
jury, it must impose a countervailing duty on the subsidized im-
port to offset the value of the subsidy.23
United States law thus erects two barriers to limit the
number of claims that American producers can potentially
bring for countervailing duties: the required finding of a sub-
sidy and proof of material injury. In the case of domestic subsi-
dies, the law makes the first barrier quite formidable by using a
narrow meaning of subsidy.2 The statute defines domestic sub-
sidy to mean only a subsidy conferred on a specific enterprise,
manufacture, production, or exportation of a class or kind of mer-
chandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation,
into the United States, and
(2) the Commission determines that-
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United
States is materially retarded,
by reason of imports of that merchandise, or by reason of sales
(or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise then there shall
be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing duty, in addi-
tion to any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net
subsidy.
Id. § 1671(a).
The phrase "country under the Agreement" refers to countries that have
signed the Subsidies Code, or a substantially equivalent agreement, or have
otherwise been determined to meet certain requirements. § 1671(b)(1)-(3).
For countries not "under the Agreement", § 303 of the Trade and Tariff Act of
1930 (TAA) applies. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982). The definition of subsidy in § 303
has the same legal meaning as under the TAA. Cabot Corp. v. United States,
620 F. Supp. 722, 730 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539
(Fed. Cir. 1986). Section 303, however, has no material injury requirement.
See Bello & Holmer, Subsidies and Natural Resources: Congress Rejects a Lat-
eral Attack on the Specifwity Test, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 297, 297
n.1 (1984).
21. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(1), 1677(1).
22. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1677(2).
23. § 1671(a).
24. § 1677(5). The definition of "subsidy" actually encompasses both "ex-
port subsidy" and "domestic subsidy." §§ 1677(5)(A)-(B). The statute explains
the meaning of export subsidy by referring to an illustrative list of export sub-
sidies contained in an annex to the Subsidies Code. Id. (referring to illustra-
tive list of export subsidies found in Subsidies Code, supra note 4, at Annex;
list is summarized supra note 17).
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industry, or group of enterprises or industries.P
B. THE SPECIFICITY TEST: CASES AND CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE
Based on the statutory definition of domestic subsidy, the
ITA and the United States Court of International Trade (CIT)
have developed a specificity test to determine whether a gov-
ernment program constitutes a domestic subsidy. The specific-
ity test states that only a government program conferring
benefits on specific enterprises or industries is a domestic sub-
sidy.26 Thus, a government program generally available to
many or all producers in the country is not a domestic subsidy
giving rise to countervailing duties.27
The ITA created a political controversy in the early 1980s
by using the specificity test to deny countervailing duty protec-
tion to some American industries hard hit by import competi-
tion. Several American producers faced foreign competition
that received natural resource inputs at prices considerably
lower than the Americans had to pay for similar resources at
25. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B). The definition in full reads as follows:
The term "subsidy" has the same meaning as the term "bounty or
grant" as that term is used in section 1303 of this title, and includes,
but is not limited to, the following-
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the Agree-
ment (relating to illustrative list of export subsidies).
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required
by government action to a specific enterprise or industry, or
group of enterprises or industries, whether publicly or privately
owned, and whether paid or bestowed directly or indirectly on
the manufacture, production, or export of any class or kind of
merchandise:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on
terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential
rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover
operating losses sustained by a specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manu-
facture, production, or distribution.
Id. § 1677(5).
26. PPG Indus. v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 258, 264 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987) (holding that government program is not countervailable unless it be-
stows benefit on specific class of industries); Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620
F. Supp. 722, 732 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (same), appeal dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539
(Fed. Cir. 1986); Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834,
837-38 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983) (upholding ITA's determination that government
program was not subsidy within meaning of countervailing duty law unless
conferring benefit upon specific enterprise or industry).
27. Carlisle, 564 F. Supp. at 837-38.
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home or on the world market.2 The American producers
claimed the lower foreign prices were subsidies. The ITA, how-
ever, refused to impose countervailing duties because the low-
priced resources were generally available programs and there-
fore did not meet the definition of a domestic subsidy under the
specificity test.29
In Carbon Black from Mexico (Carbon Black 1),30 for ex-
ample, the government-controlled oil company PEMEX sold
carbon black feedstock 31 to Mexican carbon black producers at
a price well below the world market price. The Mexican price
was reportedly two dollars per barrel while the world market
price was twenty-six dollars,32 and the feedstock reportedly ac-
counted for about seventy percent of the cost of producing car-
bon black.33 Nevertheless, the ITA held that the cheap sales of
feedstock did not amount to a countervailable domestic subsidy
because the program was not specific. Indeed, "all industrial
users of carbon black feedstock and natural gas in Mexico
[could] obtain these goods at the same price." 4 The ITA
reached this conclusion even though only two users in all of
Mexico were buying the cheap feedstock, both of which were
carbon black plants.35
In another controversial case, Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada (Softwood I),36 United States lumber
28. Unprocessed Float Glass from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,097, 23,099-100
(ITA 1984) (final determination); Portland Hydraulic Cement and Cement
Clinker from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,063, 43,066 (ITA 1983) (final determina-
tion); Carbon Black from Mexico (Carbon Black I), 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564, 29,566
(ITA 1983) (final determination); Anhydrous and Aqua Ammonia from Mex-
ico, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,522 (ITA 1983) (final determination); Certain Softwood
Lumber Prods. from Can. (Softwood I), 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, 24,167 (ITA 1983)
(final determination).
29. See cases cited supra note 28.
30. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564.
31. Carbon black feedstock is a petroleum derivative used in the produc-
tion of carbon black, which is used primarily in making rubber products.
Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722, 727 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), ap-
peal dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
32. See Panzarella, Is the Specificity Test Generally Applicable?, 18 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 417, 426 n.40 (1986) (citing Carbon Black I, 48 Fed. Reg. at
29,565).
33. Bello & Holmer, supra note 20, at 309 (citing Proposed Amendment to
the Countervailing Duty Law: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade,
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1985) (statement of
Rep. Alan B. Mollihan)).
34. Carbon Black I, 48 Fed. Reg. at 29,568.
35. See Cabot, 620 F. Supp. at 727.
36. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (ITA 1983) (final determination).
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producers claimed that Canadian federal and provincial govern-
ments sold rights to cut timber, called stumpage rights, to the
lumber industry at prices amounting to a subsidy.3 7 They ar-
gued that Canadian stumpage rights were sold at about one-
tenth of the price of comparable stumpage rights in the United
States.3 8 Paralleling its conclusion in the Carbon Black I case,
the ITA determined that the Canadian programs did not pro-
vide cheap lumber rights "only to a 'specific enterprise or in-
dustry, or group of enterprises or industries"' because all
industries interested in the lumber could obtain rights to it at
the same price.39 Thus, the stumpage programs were generally
available and not countervailable.
In response to Carbon Black I, similar cases involving Mex-
ico's sales of cheap energy to its industries,40 and Softwood I, in
1983 and 1985 members of Congress considered actions that
would have specifically excluded natural resource subsidies
from the requirements of the specificity test, thereby allowing
countervailing duties against generally available natural re-
source programs. 41 Both measures eventually failed2 because
Congress feared that passing the bills might invite mirror legis-
lation by trading partners against United States export indus-
tries,43 especially if the bills were viewed as violations of the
37. Id. at 24,167.
38. United States-Canadian Trade: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Monetary and Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Comm. of the Congress of
the United States, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986) (statement of Sen. Symms)
[hereinafter Hearings on U.S.-Canadian Trade]; Memorandum Concerning
the Appropriate Measure of Canadian Lumber Subsidies: The Preferential
Pricing of Canadian Government Timber at 16 (submitted by the petitioners,
the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, to the ITA Sept. 9, 1986).
39. Softwood I, 48 Fed. Reg. at 24,168.
40. Unprocessed Float Glass from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,097, 23,099-100
(ITA 1984) (final determination); Portland Hydraulic Cement and Cement
Clinker from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,063 (ITA 1983) (final determination);
Anhydrous and Aqua Ammonia from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,522 (1983) (ITA
final determination).
41. See Bello & Holmer, supra note 20, at 316-19 (discussing actions
considered).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 327-28; see also Dual Pricing of Natural Resources, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Comm. on Finance of the
United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 39 (1986) (statement of Gilbert
Kaplan, Ass't Secretary for Import Admin., Dep't of Commerce) (arguing that
if Congress passes natural resources provision before it, other governments are
likely to use mirror legislation to strike at United States resource practices);
id. at 27 (statement of Alan Holmer, Deputy U.S. Trade Rep.) (arguing that
following course of pending bills and disregard specificity standard will open
Pandora's box, and other countries could and would use mirror legislation to
19881 1165
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GATT Subsidies Code. 4
Amidst this controversy surrounding the natural resource
subsidy cases and the natural resource subsidy bills, the CIT is-
sued a decision in the fall of 1985 that modified the specificity
test. Cabot Corp. v. United States45 involved an appeal to the
CIT of the ITA's final determination in the Carbon Black I
case.46 Cabot argued, among other things, that the ITA had in-
correctly applied the specificity standard.47 Because only two
Mexican producers used carbon black feedstock, Cabot argued,
the program to sell feedstock below the world market price was
a specific subsidy regardless of whether the Mexican law on its
face made the cheap feedstock generally available to all Mexi-
can industries.48 The CIT agreed with Cabot, holding that
when a government program, nominally available to all indus-
tries, only works to confer a benefit on specific enterprises or
industries, the program meets the test for a countervailable
subsidy.49
attack some of strongest United States export industries) [hereinafter Hearing
on Dual Pricing].
44. Hearing on Dual Pricing, supra note 43, at 27. Debate has raged on
the question of whether the Subsidies Code actually requires the specificity
test. Consider this discussion between Senator Baucus and Alan F. Holmer,
Deputy United States Trade Representative:
Senator BAucus: Mr. Holmer, you seem to say, in fact expressly
say that this bill is GATT-illegal, whereas I am sure you know, in the
GATT subsidies code, there is no language which requires the kind of
specificity which you claim it requires .... Where is the language
that requires it?
Mr. HOLMER: Lawyers, both American and non-American, look
at that language [in the Subsidies Code and GATT] and can, fairly say,
"it is not crystal clear; you could argue that countervailing generally
available benefits is permissible."
Id. at 43.
Mr. Holmer nevertheless argued that a tacit international understanding
surrounded the specificity test and that any action by Congress which could be
construed as a violation of that understanding would lead to retaliation against
United States exports. Id. at 25-27; see also Note, The Natural Resources Sub-
sidy Bills: Should They Be Adopted?, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197, 217-18 (1987)
(arguing that excepting natural resources from specificity test would not vio-
late Subsidies Code).
45. 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
46. Id. at 725-28.
47. Id. at 728-29.
48. Plaintiff's Consolidated Reply at 26-32, Cabot Corp. v. United States,
620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (available from Stewart & Stewart, 1001 Connecticut Ave., N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20036).
49. 620 F. Supp. at 732. The court stressed that a law making benefits
generally available on its face could in practice accrue benefits to specific in-
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The Cabot decision's change in the specificity test led to the
reversal of two earlier controversial natural resource deci-
sions-Carbon Black I and Softwood 1.50 The reversal of the
dustries. Id. at 731. The appropriate standard focused on "the defacto case by
case effect of benefits provided to recipients rather than on the nominal avail-
ability of benefits." Id. at 732.
50. The first reversal involved the carbon black feedstock sales that were
the subject of Carbon Black , 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (ITA 1983) (final determina-
tion) and Cabot. The Cabot court did not actually decide that Mexico's subsi-
dies on carbon black feedstock were countervailable, but only that the ITA
had used the wrong test to determine specificity. 620 F. Supp. at 731-33. The
court ordered the case remanded to the ITA for determination whether the
subsidized sale of carbon black feedstock to the carbon black producers in fact
benefited a specific industry under the new test the court prescribed. Id. at
734. The ITA applied the new standard and held that the carbon black pro-
gram applied to a specific industry, Carbon Black from Mexico (Carbon Black
HI), 51 Fed. Reg. 13,269, 13,271 (ITA 1986) (preliminary review), affirmed, Car-
bon Black from Mexico (Carbon Black III), 51 Fed. Reg. 30,385 (ITA 1986) (fi-
nal results), but that the program did not provide preferential prices within
the meaning of the definition of subsidy. Carbon Black II, 51 Fed. Reg. at
13,271. The Cabot case also led the ITA to reverse its determination in the
Softwood I case, which had held the Canadian lumber programs were not
countervailable. Softwood 1, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, 24,167 (ITA 1983) (final deter-
mination). Based on the Cabot decision and the petitioner's finding of new evi-
dence, the ITA decided to rehear the case. Certain Softwood Lumber Prods.
from Can. (Softwood II), 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453, 37,455 (ITA 1986) (preliminary
determination). The ITA found that the stumpage program did amount to a
countervailable subsidy. Id. at 37,457. The United States and Canada agreed to
a settlement of the dispute before the ITA made its final determination. 4
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 6 (Jan. 7, 1987). Under the settlement, Can-
ada agreed to impose a 15% export tax on its softwood lumber exports to the
United States. Id.
Although the ITA in Softwood H stated that the Cabot case had influenced
its decision to reconsider the Softwood I determination, 51 Fed. Reg. at 37,455,
the reversal of Softwood I arguably depended on a finding of new facts applied
to legal standards in existence before Cabot and not necessarily on Cabot's ex-
panded specificity test. In Softwood I the ITA had denied the petitioners relief
for several reasons: the government made the subsidies nominally available to
any Canadian user-, the subsidies in fact benefited several industries including
the lumber and wood products industry, the paper and pulp industry, and the
furniture manufacturing industry;, any actual limit on the number of indus-
tries benefiting from the subsidy was due to the inherent nature of the prod-
uct and technology; and the pricing scheme for lumber-cutting rights
employed by the Canadian government was not "preferential" within the'
meaning of the TAA. 48 Fed. Reg. at 24,167.
In Softwood H the ITA stressed new evidence that the provincial adminis-
trators of the stumpage rights programs exercised discretion to distort the ben-
efits of the programs in favor of the lumber industry to the detriment of the
pulp industry. 51 Fed. Reg. at 37,456. In other cases the ITA has held that a
domestic benefit program is countervailable whenever the government does
not employ neutral criteria in deciding who will benefit from the program.
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia, 51 Fed. Reg. 4206, 4210 (ITA 1986)
(final determination) (providing of basic infrastructure does not confer
198 1167
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Carbon Black and Softwood I cases apparently helped placate
Congress. Rather than seeking legislation to exclude natural
resource programs from the specificity test as in 1983 and 1985,
members of Congress introduced bills, presently pending, that
would codify the Cabot version of the specificity test as the stat-
utory definition of a domestic subsidy.5- Several members of
countervailable subsidy if government does not limit who can move into area
where infrastructure has been built); Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from
Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,041, 10,061-62 (ITA 1986) (final determination) (same).
The ITA had not found the neutral criteria test violated in its first determina-
tion of the case. The fact that the ITA found new evidence that the neutral
criteria test was violated in its second determination, Softwood 11, 51 Fed. Reg.
at 37,456, would have been sufficient grounds to find the subsidy countervail-
able even without the Cabot case.
The ITA also found new evidence that brought the Softwood II case
within the Cabot rule. The ITA reversed its earlier conclusion that the bene-
fits of the stumpage program were generally available. Id. In fact, the ITA
decided, the program did benefit a specific industry or group of industries. Id.
Although in its earlier determination the ITA found that the stumpage pro-
gram bestowed benefits on several different industries, including the lumber
and wood products industry, the paper and pulp industry, and the furniture
industry, Softwood I, 48 Fed. Reg. at 24,167, the ITA in its second determina-
tion found that the furniture industry received no significant benefit and that
the wood, wood products, paper, and pulp industries were essentially one in-
dustry. Softwood II, 51 Fed. Reg. at 37,456-57. As a result of this conclusion,
together with the ITA's next finding that the prices under the stumpage pro-
gram were in fact preferential, id. at 37,457, the ITA held that the stumpage
program satisfied the specificity test and was a countervailable subsidy. Id. at
37,457-58.
The case becomes more confusing, however, because this alternative hold-
ing conflicts with the ITA's first holding, that the stumpage program violates
the neutral criteria test. To find that the neutral criteria test was violated, the
ITA had to conclude that the stumpage program discriminated in favor of the
wood and wood products industry to the detriment of the paper and pulp in-
dustry. See id. at 37,456. This implied that the wood and wood products indus-
try was a separate industry from the paper and pulp industry. In the
alternative holding, however, the ITA concluded that the wood and wood
products and paper and pulp industries were one horizontally integrated in-
dustry, togehter constituting a specific industry receiving a government bene-
fit. Id. at 37,456-57. Within the same opinion, then, the ITA has asserted both
that the wood and wood products and the paper and pulp industries were two
separate industries and that they were part of one industry. The precedential
value of the opinion is therefore questionable.
51. The House and Senate have taken similar approaches to the question
of domestic subsidies, and a bill from each house is presently in conference
committee. The House bill is H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Seas., 133 CONG. REC.
H2663 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987) (popular name is Trade and International Eco-
nomic Policy Reform Act of 1987). H.R. 3 was introduced on January 6, 1987,
and passed both the House Committee on Ways and Means on March 25, 1987,
and the House floor on April 30, 1987. The Senate bill began as S. 490, 100th
Cong., 1st. Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S1852 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1987) (popular name is
Omnibus Trade Act of 1987). S. 490 was introduced February 5, 1987, passed
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Congress have expressed their approval of the Softwood I re-
the Senate Committee on Finance May 5, 1987, and was incorporated into S.
1420 on June 24, 1987. S. 1420, 100th Congress, 1st Sess. (1987). S. 1420 was
introduced June 24, 1987 and debated on the Senate floor without referral to a
committee. After H.R. 3 passed the House and was sent to the Senate, the
Senate incorporated S. 1420 into H.R. 3 and passed that bill on July 21, 1987.
As of April 4, 1988, the bills remain in conference committee. Both would
amend the definition of domestic subsidy found in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982) by
adding a special rule to interpret the old definition. The special rule states the
Cabot rule. The relevant section of the Senate bill reads as follows:
(5) SUBSIDY-
(A) IN GENERAL.-The term "subsidy" has the same meaning
as the term "bounty or grant" as that term is used in section 303,
and includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(i) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the
Agreement (relating to illustrative list of export subsidies).
(ii) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or re-
quired by government action to a specific enterprise or indus-
try, or group of enterprises or industries, whether publicly or
privately owned and whether paid or bestowed directly or in-
directly on the manufacture, production, or export of any
class or kind of merchandise:
(I) The provision of captial, loans, or loan guaran-
tees on terms inconsistent with commercial considera-
tions.
(II) The provision of goods or services at preferen-
tial rates.
(HI) The grant of funds, or forgiveness of debt, to
cover operating losses sustained by a specific industry.
(IV) The assumption of any costs or expense of
manufacture, production, and distribution.
(B) SPECIAL RULE.-In applying subparagraph (A), the ad-
ministering authority, in each investigation, shall determine
whether the bounty, grant, or subsidy in law or in fact is provided
to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or in-
dustries. Nominal general availability, under the terms of the
law, regulation, program, or rule establishing a bounty, grant, or
subsidy, of the benefits thereunder is not a basis for determining
that the bounty, grant, or subsidy is not, or has not been, in fact
provided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group thereof.
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, REPORT ON S. 490, S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 368-69 (1987) [hereinafter FINANCE COmbrEE REPORT ON S.490].
Subparagraph A of this section is identical to the previous law under 19
U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982), except that the subsection headings are ranked to ac-
commodate the addition of the special rule of subparagraph B. The Senate
Committee on Finance expressly stated its intent that this special rule codify
the holding of Cabot Corporation v. United States. Id. at 122.
The relevant section of the House bill also leaves the previous definition
of subsidy untouched, except for the addition of its own special rule similarly,
though not identically, worded to the Senate version:
(B) SPECIAL RULE.-In applying subparagraph (A), the adminis-
tering authority, in each investigation, shall determine whether the
benefits under the bounty, grant, or subsidy are actually paid to or be-
stowed on a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or
industries. A nominal general availability, under the terms of the law
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or rule establishing a bounty, grant, or subsidy, of the benefits there-
under is not cause for determining that the bounty, grant, or subsidy
cannot be, or has not been, paid or bestowed on a specific enterprise
or industry, or group thereof.
H.R. 3, supra.
The report of the House Committee on Ways and Means also explicitly
states the Committee's intention to codify the holding of the Cabot case.
HOUSE CoMm. ON WAYS & MEANS, REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.P 3, H.R. REP.
No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 123 (1987) [hereinafter WAYS AND
MEANS REPORT ON H.R. 3]. The House bill goes beyond the Senate bill by cre-
ating a new rule on the determination of preferential rates. In the past the
ITA took a narrow view of what constituted preferential rates for the pur-
poses of § 677(5)(B)(ii) of the TAA. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1982). This section
states that "[t]he provision of goods or services at preferential rates" to a spe-
cific enterprise or industry, or groups thereof, [is] a countervailable subsidy.
Id. In cases such as Carbon Black I, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564, 29,566 (ITA 1983) (fi-
nal determination), and Softwood I, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, 24,168 (ITA 1983) (fi-
nal determination), the ITA had ruled that preferential pricing existed only
when different industries in the same country had paid different prices for the
same good or service. The ITA had not determined preferential pricing to ex-
ist when a government sold its goods or services at home for less than its ex-
port price or for less than commercial considerations would otherwise allow.
See WAYS AND MEANS REPORT ON H.R. 3, supra, at 124-25. The Cabot court
criticized the ITA's reasoning as being tautological. Cabot, 620 F. Supp. at 732-
33. The ITA subsequently introduced the preferentiality appendix in its re-
consideration of the Carbon Black case. Carbon Black II, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,269,
13,272-73 (ITA 1986) (preliminary determination). Under the preferentiality
appendix, the ITA stated that to find a preferential price it would look first at
whether the government generally sold similar goods or services at a higher
price to another domestic firm. Id. at 13,272. If the government did not sell
the same good or service to other buyers, the ITA would look next to whether
other sellers sold similar goods or services, comparing their price to the gov-
ernment's price. Id. at 13,272-73. The third alternative would be to look to the
government's cost of producing the goods or services to determine whether the
government sold the goods or services below cost. Id. at 13,273. The final com-
parison would be to external prices, such as the export price or the world mar-
ket price. 1d. H.R. 3 would codify a similar preferentiality index into law.
(C) DETERMINATION OF PREFERENTIAL RATES.-For purposes of deter-
mining under subparagraph (A)(ii)(II) whether the rate at which
goods or services are provided is preferential, the administering au-
thority shall compare such rate with the following.
(i) The freely available and market-determined rate at which
such or similar goods or services are provided within the country.
(ii) If a rate cannot be determined under clause (i), an appropri-
ate rate applicable to external transactions regarding such or sim-
ilar goods or services, including, but not limited to-
(I) the rate (if different from the rate subject to investiga-
tion) at which the government provides such or similar goods
or services for export;
(H) the world market rate if any, for such or similar goods or
services; or
(III) the freely available and market-determined rate at
which such or similar goods or services are provided within
another country that has a market for the goods or service
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versa 52 and their belief that enacting the Cabot test would ade-
quately tighten United States countervailing duty law, thereby
avoiding the kind of conflicts arising over the earlier natural
resource cases.
5 3
A recent case, however, suggests that the Cabot expanded
specificity test will not prevent the recurrence of controversial
natural resource cases similar to those Congress had considered
unacceptable. In PPG Industries v. United States,s 4 the CIT re-
viewed a pre-Cabot ITA determination that the Mexican gov-
ernment's sale of natural gas to Mexican float glass5 5 producers
at below world market prices did not amount to a countervail-
able subsidy because the natural gas was generally available to
all Mexican industries.56 The appellant argued that the speci-
ficity test conflicted with "the legislative history and purpose of
the countervailing duty law"57 and that any government pro-
gram that had the effect of reducing the cost of producing or
exporting a good must be countervailed.5 8 The CIT rejected the
petitioner's contention and applied the Cabot de facto specificity
standard.5 9 Using this lower specificity standard, the court up-
that is similar to the market of the country subject to the
investigation.
(iii) If a rate cannot be determined under clause (ii), a rate deter-
mined by the administering authority, on the basis of the best in-
formation available to it, that reflects-
(I) the cost of producing the goods or providing the services;
and
(11) a reasonable profit for such production or provision.
HR. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. H2663 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987).
52. See, e.g., WAYS AND MEANs REPORT ON H.R. 3, supra note 51, at 126
(favoring the broader Cabot interpretation).
53. Id.; see also FINANcE COMMrITEE REPORT ON S. 490, supra note 51, at
122-23 (expressing Committee's approval of Cabot standard).
54. 662 F. Supp. 258 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). PPG Industries was decided
May 15, 1987. The House trade bill, H.R. 3, supra note 51, passed the House
floor on April 30, 1987. The Senate trade bill, S. 490, supra note 51, passed its
final committee, the Senate Finance committee, on May 7, 1987. It was incor-
porated into S. 1420 on June 24, 1987, and S. 1420 was then incorporated into
H.R. 3, which passed the Senate on July 21, 1987. It is therefore safe to as-
sume the PPG Industries case received no consideration from the House and
little if any from the Senate.
55. Float glass, a type of flat glass, is produced by floating molten glass
over a bed of molten tin. PPG Indus., 662 F. Supp. at 260 n.1.
56. Unprocessed Float Glass from Mexico (Float Glass), 49 Fed. Reg.
23,097, 23,099-100 (ITA 1984) (final determination); see also Unprocessed Float
Glass from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,095, 56,095-96 (ITA 1983) (preliminary de-
termination) (refusing to compare domestic price against export price).
57. PPG Indus., 662 F. Supp. at 264.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 265.
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held the ITA's finding that "the float glass companies paid the
published price for natural gas that was available to all indus-
tries and therefore received no countervailable benefit."60 PPG
Industries thus clarified the Cabot rule to mean that when a
government program is nominally generally available and in
fact widely used, the program is not a countervailable subsidy.
Two cases immediately following PPG Industries further rein-
forced this reading of Cabot.61
In upholding the ITA's determination that the Mexican
natural gas program did not warrant countervailing duties, the
CIT implicitly reaffirmed several pre-Cabot cases involving pre-
cisely the same Mexican energy policies.62 These and other
Mexican energy decisions like Carbon Black I had contributed
greatly to the controversy in Congress leading to the introduc-
tion of the 1983 and 1985 bills.63 The fact that the PPG Indus-
tries decision implicitly reaffirmed these earlier unpopular
decisions suggests that the potential for controversy over the
specificity test continues, even in its post-Cabot form. The like-
lihood that the specificity test will continue to generate politi-
cally unpopular decisions highlights the need to consider
alternatives to the test. A proposal to change the specificity
60. Id. at 272.
61. See Can-Am Corp. v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 1444, 1448-49 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1987) (Mexican government's sale of fuel oil to Mexican lime pro-
ducers at price significantly below export price of Mexican fuel oil did not
amount to countervailable subsidy because all domestic industrial users could
obtain fuel oil at same price, group of domestic industrial users was not spe-
cific group, and lime producers did not benefit as specific enterprise or indus-
try even though they used significantly more fuel oil than many other
industries benefiting from cheap sales of fuel oil); Al Tech Specialty Steel
Corp. v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1206, 1212-13 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (bene-
fits conferred on Spanish steel producer in bankruptcy reorganization were
not countervailable subsidies because benefits were not limited to specific in-
dustries but accrued generally to industries in bankruptcy).
62. Specifically, in the cases of Portland Hydraulic Cement and Cement
Clinker from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,063, 43,066 (ITA 1983) (final determina-
tion) and Anhydrous and Aqua Ammonia from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,522,
28,524 (ITA 1983) (final determination), the ITA had denied the petitioners
protection from imports benefiting from the natural gas and petroleum pro-
grams because they were generally available. Because these subsidies were
the same as in the later Float Glass case, the ITA made its decision in the
Float Glass case simply by referring to the earlier decisions. 48 Fed. Reg. at
56,095-96.
63. See Hearing on Dual Pricing, supra note 43, at 3 (while dual pricing
of natural resources is practiced by many countries, Mexico's practices have
received most attention); see also Bello & Holmer, supra note 20, at 316-17
(aim of proposals to reform specificity test in 98th Congress was to overturn
Mexican natural resource decisions).
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test can best be developed by looking to the policies underlying
the specificity test.
C. RATIONALE FOR THE SPECIFICITY TEST
Three policy goals underlie the specificity test. First, the
test supposedly serves as a practical limit on the number of pos-
sible claims United States industries can bring against subsidies
in foreign countries. Such a practical limit on the number of
countervailing duty actions is needed because all industries in
every country receive some direct or indirect government bene-
fits.64  A rule that made every government benefit a
countervailable subsidy would mean that every product im-
ported into the United States potentially would be tainted by a
subsidy.65 If other countries adopted similar rules, virtually
every Untied States export also would be tainted by a subsidy.66
As a result, the United States and its trading partners would
face essentially no limit in enacting countervailing duties
against one another's exports. This possibility made it neces-
sary to define subsidy narrowly to include only specific bene-
fits. 67  Indeed, concern that mirror legislation by other
countries would damage United States exports if this country
64. See Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834, 838
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 838-39. In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp.
1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), the court in dicta criticized the specificity test be-
cause it denied American producers protection from imports receiving a gov-
ernment advantage just because the program conferring the advantage was
generally available in the competitor's country. Id. at 1241-45. The Bethlehem
court wrote:
Can it be argued that financial assistance which is inconsistent with
commercial considerations is no longer a subsidy when it is part of the
basic policy of a government and available to all businesses? This ap-
proach cannot be reconciled with the fundamental purpose of the law
which must extend to certain commercial advantages even when a
country has chosen to make them universally available. The question
is not what is normal in the economy under investigation, but rather
what is reconcilable with the standards of commercial fairness envi-
sioned by the countervailing duty law.
Id. at 1242. The court further contended that the specificity test has "no sup-
port in logic or law." Id. In spite of this dicta, the CIT has continued to be
concerned with the Carlisle absurdity and has repeatedly cited the Carlisle
court's reasoning to support a decision requiring some degree of specificity to
find a countervailable subsidy. See, e.g., PPG Indus. v. United States, 662 F.
Supp. 258, 265 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp.
722, 731-32 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
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discontinued adherence to the specificity test strongly influ-
enced Congress's decision not to pass bills eliminating the
test.
68
Second, some scholars maintain that the specificity test
minimizes the distortive economic effects of countervailing du-
ties by separating subsidies which distort economic efficiency
from those that do not.69 The economic theory of comparative
advantage7" suggests that gains from international trade are
maximized when countries export goods that they can produce
relatively more efficiently than producers in other countries
and import goods that other countries can produce more effi-
ciently.71 A specific subsidy supposedly misallocates resources
away from a country's efficient industries into its inefficient
ones, thereby raising prices for importers of the affected prod-
ucts. 72 An example concisely illustrates the argument:
68. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
69. See Panzarella, supra note 32, at 423-24 & n.30 (citing ITA determina-
tions and Commerce Department paper).
70. See id. (describing theory as rationale for specificity test).
71. See J. PEN, A PRIMER ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 12-20 (1967).
72. See id. at 13-14 (defining concept of comparative costs). The theory
can be stated more formally: Efficiency for purposes of this theory is defined
in terms of opportunity cost, or the number of units of the production of one
good a country must give up to gain one additional unit of production of an-
other good. Id. A difference in opportunity costs among countries brings ad-
vantages from trade. Id. Consider this example from Pen's discussion:
Suppose that in one country (call it the United States) the mass pro-
duction of cars is highly efficient and that there is a good deal of auto-
mation in the industry. The production of bicycles is somewhat less
developed and less efficient than the automobile industry. In another
country, a small one (call it Bicyclia)- the situation is the other way
round. [Suppose Bicyclia is highly efficient at producing bicycles.] ...
And suppose that all this results in a cost ratio of 1 car to 50 bicycles
in the United States and of 1 car to 100 bicycles in Bicyclia.
If that is the case, a little thought will show that it is to the ad-
vantage of the United States to specialize in the production of cars,
export some of them to Bicyclia, and then get back a number of bi-
cycles. For if the Americans manufacture[d] their own bicycles, they
would have to sacrifice 1 car for every 50 bikes produced. But the Bi-
cyclians will be prepared to offer more than 50 bicycles (but less than
100) for 1 American car. This is a profitable deal for the American
economy as a whole [and for the Bicyclian economy].
Id. at 14-15. A domestic subsidy creates inefficiencies by distorting the natural
opportunity costs within the country. If the United States government in
Pen's example were to subsidize the production of bicycles so that after the
subsidy the cost ratio between cars and bicycles in the United States were 1 to
100, the importation of bicycles from Bicyclia would cease because no price dif-
ferential would exist. Cf. id. at 14 (arguing that difference in costs brings
gains from trade). The protected United States producers of bicycles would re-
ceive increased profits from the subsidy, but all United States taxpayers would
have to pay for the subsidy. See L. WINTERS, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 70
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[Suppose a country, Utopia, offers a subsidy on domestic shoe produc-
tion.] The misallocation of resources to shoe production in Utopia
would generate higher costs and hence higher prices for some other
Utopian product, for example, widgets. If the United States is an im-
porter of Utopian widgets, it will be hurt by the higher widget
prices.7 3
Scholars assert that a generally available benefit, on the
other hand, does not distort the allocation of resources within a
country because the benefit accrues to all industries equally.74
Thus in the shoe and widget example, a generally available sub-
sidy would reduce the shoe makers' and widget makers' costs
by exactly the same percentage. As a result the generally avail-
able subsidy would not induce a reallocation of resources from
the widget industry to the shoe industry and would not raise
the price paid in the United States for imported Utopian
widgets. 75
Finally, the specificity test is based on notions of fairness
regarding the appropriate role for government in the economy.
United States producers generally consider it unfair to have to
compete against foreign rivals run or propped up by their gov-
ernments when at home United States producers must follow
the "survival of the most efficient" rule of free competition.76
(3d ed. 1985). The amount of the increased taxes needed to pay for the subsidy
would exceed the amount of increased profits to the bicycle industry. See id.
But see Brander, Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy, in
STRATEGIC TRADE POICY AND THE NEw INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIcs 23, 28-29
(P. Krugman ed. 1986) (arguing that when conditions of oligopolistic competi-
tion, as opposed to perfect competition, prevail, subsidy will result in increased
profits to domestic producers in excess of cost to taxpayers supporting sub-
sidy). Bicyclia also would suffer because it would no longer be able to buy
American cars for a cheaper price (in terms of bicycles) than it pays for its
own inefficiently made cars. Cf. J. PEN, supra note 71, at 18 (bicycles will be
cheaper in Bicyclia only in absence of barriers to trade); Barcel6, The Two-
Track Subsidies Code-Countervailing Duties and Trade Retaliation, in NON-
TARiFF BAPRIERS AFTER THE TOKYO ROuND 121, 132 (J. Quinn & P. Slayton
eds. 1982) (inefficient subsidy in one country can have negative impact in an-
other). Even if the United States government in this example did not provide
a subsidy large enough to eliminate all difference in opportunity costs between
the United States and Bicyclia, global wealth would still be reduced by the
subsidy. On the United States side, the amount of the subsidy would still ex-
ceed the extra profits gained by United States bicycle producers because of the
subsidy. See L. WINrERs, supra, at 70. Bicyclians also would pay more in
terms of bicycles to get one American car. J. PEN, supra note 71, at 12-21;
Barcel6, supra, at 132.
73. Barcel6, supra note 72, at 132.
74. Bello & Holmer, supra note 20, at 302 & n.26.
75. See id. (generally available domestic subsidies accrue benefits to all in-
dustries in economy).
76. Barcel6, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping After the
1988] 1175
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
At the same time, United States producers expect their govern-
ment to provide certain kinds of generally available benefits,
such as education, defense, and roadbuilding.77 It therefore
seems fair to enact countervailing duties only against specifw
foreign subsidies that are not analogous to the generally avail-
able programs considered acceptable aims of government.7
II. THE OPERATION OF THE SPECIFICITY TEST
Although the specificity test is based on three policy objec-
tives-providing a practical limit to the number of counter-
vailing duty actions, combating economic distortion, and
bringing fairness to trade-in operation the test serves only the
first goal well.
Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257, 279-80 (1980). Americans in general
view themselves as providing far fewer subsidies than their trading partners.
HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE TRADE AND INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM ACT OF 1987, H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 3, at 60-61 (1987) [hereinafter FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPORT ON H.R.
3], states the following:
America continues to pursue market-based policies, emphasizing that
government plays a major role in setting overall economic policy and
regulating domestic and international markets, but that decisions on
production, research, wages, investments, sale of technology, and
long-term industrial strategy should be left to private companies.
Many countries take another approach. France and Japan are the
leading examples of industrial countries that relied on extensive gov-
ernment guidance and intervention. Even in free-market Germany,
government spending and government policy play a far greater role
than they do in the United States.
Id.; see also Hearing on Dual Pricing, supra note 43, at 47 (statement of Sen.
Baucus) (on per capita basis subsidies in most every other country greatly ex-
ceed all subsidies in this country); G. HUFBAUER & J. SHELTON-ERB, SUBSIDIES
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3, tables 1.1 & 1.2 (1984) (giving statistics showing
United States has fewer subsidies than its major trading partners).
77. See PPG Indus. v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 258, 265 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987) (mentioning infrastructure, education, and national defense as genera-
lized public benefits); Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722, 731 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1985) (same), appeal dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Car-
lisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834, 838 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984) (public highways and bridges, as well as generalized tax credit for ex-
penditures on capital investment, should not give rise to countervailing du-
ties); see also Hearing on Dual Pricing, supra note 43, at 46 (statement of
Gilbert Kaplan, Deputy Ass't Secretary for Import Admin., Dep't of Com-
merce) ("If you talk about a public highway or if you talk about hospitalization
or if you talk about public education, these are things that governments do,
and they are not really subsidies.").
78. Hearing on Dual Pricing, supra note 43, at 42 (Gilbert Kaplan, Dep-
uty Ass't Secretary for Import Admin., Dep't of Commerce) (broad-scale inter-
ventions in economy should not create countervailing duties because every
nation, including United States, uses them).
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A. THE PRACTICAL LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF
COUNTERVAILING DUTY ACTIONS
The specificity test has served effectively as a practical
limit on the number of successful actions for countervailing du-
ties against domestic government benefit programs. Indeed, the
ITA and CIT in several cases have used the specificity test to
deny petitioners the protection they sought.7 9 Members of Con-
gress and the executive branch also have recognized the speci-
ficity test's role in drawing a line to prevent too many
countervailing duty actions against subsidies.8 0 In fact, the fear
of having no practical limit on the number of possible counter-
vailing duty actions, and of thereby creating a vicious cycle of
protection, was the primary reason Congress hesitated to dis-
card the specificity test for natural resource subsidies.8 '
1. The Economic Objective
The argument that specific domestic subsidies distort trade
while generally available programs do not8 2 ignores that, in
practice, many generally available government programs do dis-
tort trade because they do not affect all industries' costs
equally.8 3 For example, the ITA ruled that the Mexican gov-
ernment's sale of natural gas to its industries at less than the
world market price was a generally available program not
countervailable under United States law.84 Yet common sense
suggests that Mexico's natural gas price controls reduced costs
in industries that used a large amount of natural gas in their
production more than in industries that used less or even no
79. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
80. See Hearing on Dual Pricing, supra note 43, at 43 (statement of Sen.
Baucus) ("[D]oesn't this really come down to where you draw the line? That
is what this is all about."); id. at 42 (statement of Gilbert Kaplan, Deputy Ass't
Secretary for Import Admin., Dep't of Commerce) ("[Y]ou have got to draw
the line at some point, and we think this bill goes too far.").
81. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for Con-
gress's failure to pass earlier natural resource bills).
82. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
83. Panzarella, supra note 32, at 424 (even generally available subsidy will
distort resource allocation if it accrues greater relative benefit to certain sec-
tors of economy).
84. Unprocessed Float Glass from Mexico (Float Glass), 49 Fed. Reg.
23,097, 23,099-100 (ITA 1984) (final determination); Portland Hydraulic Ce-
ment and Cement Clinker from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,063, 43,066 (ITA 1983)
(final determination); Carbon Black from Mexico (Carbon Black I), 48 Fed.
Reg. 29,564, 29,566 (ITA 1983) (final determination); Anhydrous and Aqua Am-
monia from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,522, 28,522 (ITA 1983) (final
determination).
1988] 1177
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
natural gas. By affecting costs in different industries dispa-
rately, a generally available program such as Mexico's cheap
natural gas sales induces a reallocation of resources into the in-
dustries benefited by the program-those that use a large
amount of the subsidized resource--and away from the indus-
tries not benefited-those that use little or none of the subsi-
dized resource. This reallocation of resources distorts the
operation of comparative advantage by artificially inducing a
shift in the use of resources away from the more efficient
users.
8 5
Even among the Mexican industries that used significant
amounts of natural gas in their manufacturing processes, the
reduced price affected each industry's costs differently. For ex-
ample, ammonia producers claimed that natural gas comprised
80% of the cost of producing ammonia,86 whereas a float glass
producer stated that natural gas constituted only 20 to 30% of
the cost of manufacturing float glass.8 7 Witnesses before Con-
gress claimed that the Mexican government sold the natural
gas at a price 90% below world market price.88 At that level of
price reduction, the Mexican ammonia producers' costs would
be reduced by 72% (90% savings on 80% of costs), while the
Mexican float glass producers would receive an 18 to 27% re-
duction (90% savings on 20-30% of costs). The variant cost
structure in these two industries demonstrates how a so-called
generally available program can disparately affect costs even
among industries that use a large quantity of the resource and
hence distort the operation of comparative advantage by induc-
ing inefficient shifts in the allocation of resources among vari-
ous uses. Because virtually no government program, no matter
how generally available, affects all industries' costs equally, the
specificity test fails to distinguish government programs that
distort the operation of comparative advantage from those that
do not.
85. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (discussion of compara-
tive advantage theory).
86. Bello & Holmer, supra note 20, at 309 & n.70 (citing petition of W.L.
Grace & Co., First Miss. Corp., Mississippi Chem. Corp., & Olin Corp., file no.
C201-010, vol. 1 (Oct. 28, 1982) (available at Dep't of Commerce, Import Ad-
min., Central Records Unit, Room B-099)).
87. Telephone interview with Glenn Miller, Counsel for PPG Indus.
(Sept. 20, 1987).
88. Mexicans paid $.44 per MMBtu, while foreigners paid $4.94 per
MMBtu. Hearing on Dual Pricing, supra note 43, at 3 (Finance Committee
Trade Staff Memorandum of June 25, 1986).
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B. THE FAIRNESS PRINCIPLE
In theory the specificity test serves a vague popular notion
of fairness based on American producers' belief that govern-
ment benefits bestowed on specific industries create unfair
competitive advantages but that generally available domestic
programs are acceptable at home and therefore should be toler-
ated abroad.8 9 Yet the Canadian and Mexican governments'
programs to provide natural resources to their industries at less
than world market prices did not seem fair to United States
producers even though the ITA found that these programs
were generally available.90 Arguably, the results in Carbon
Black 191 and Softwood 1 92 seemed unfair because the govern-
ment programs under scrutiny in those cases appeared more
specific than generally available.93 Mexico's sale of natural gas
to its industries at below world market prices, however, was a
much more generally available program than those in the Car-
bon Black I and Softwood I cases.94 Nevertheless, Congress still
viewed the outcomes of these natural gas cases as unfair.95
Congress was apparently undisturbed by its own record of con-
trolling natural gas prices at less than market prices for a pe-
riod of over forty years.96
89. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
91. Carbon Black from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (ITA 1983) (final
determination).
92. Certain Softwood Lumber Prods. from Can., 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (ITA
1983) (final determination).
93. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (carbon black subsidy
benefited only two industrial plants); supra note 50 (stumpage subsidy affected
only wood and wood products and paper and pulp industries).
94. The cases discussed in this Note alone demonstrate the diversity of in-
dustries that use natural gas as an important input: the ammonia, float glass,
and carbon black industries all claimed injury from the Mexican programs.
See supra note 62. Evidence exists that Congress regards a subsidy on natural
gas as a generally available subsidy. See WAYS AND MEANS REPORT ON H.R. 3,
supra note 51, at 124 (stating that natural gas subsidy freely available to all
purchasers in country without government restriction would not "likely" be
countervailable subsidy).
95. Congress's attempt to exempt natural resource subsidies from the
specificity test, see supra note 41 and accompanying text, shows that it consid-
ered the specificity test unfair in the natural resource cases. Congress ulti-
mately decided not to pass these exemptions, however, because of the threat of
mirror legislation, see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text, and not be-
cause it accepted the specificity test as fair.
96. Congress imposed natural gas price controls in 1938 and began to
phase them out in 1978. During much of this time the price was held below
market price. See Note, Deregulation and Natural Gas Purchase Contracts:
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Arguably, Congress and United States producers are more
concerned about the size of the competitive threat posed by a
foreign government program than whether the program applies
specifically or generally. They perceive the specificity test as
unfair when it bars protection against imports receiving large
advantages while allowing the imposition of countervailing du-
ties against much smaller subsidies.97 For example, comparing
the magnitude of the competitive threat faced by the successful
petitioners in Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada
(Softwood H)98 with that faced by the unsuccessful petitioners
in PPG Industries v. United States99 and Anhydrous and Aqua
Ammonia from Mexico 100 shows that the unsuccessful petition-
ers were at least as threatened by the challenged practices as
the successful petitioners. According to the figures calculated
above, the Mexican natural gas program gave Mexican float
glass producers a competitive advantage of 18 to 27% over PPG
Industries'0 1 and gave the Mexican ammonia producers a cost
advantage of 72% over their United States counterparts. 0 2
Examination Through Neoclassical and Relational Contract Theories, 25
WAsHBURN L.J. 43, 44 (1985).
97. For example, the ITA in Carbon Black II found the total countervail-
able subsidy from several government programs (not counting the carbon
black feedstock program) totaled 0.80%. 51 Fed. Reg. 13,269, 13,272 (ITA 1986).
Gary Hufbauer and Joanna Shelton-Erb mention a case in which the ITC
found material injury on a subsidy of 0.000%. G. HUFBAUER & J. SHELTON-
ERB, supra note 76, at 89; see also Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from
Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,041, 10,044-59 (ITA 1986) (final determination) (sev-
eral government programs conferred subsidy on fishing industry of less than
one percent, but when added together net subsidy was 5.82%); Unprocessed
Float Glass from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,095, 56,095 (ITA 1983) (preliminary
determination) (government finance program conferred countervailable bene-
fit of 1.63%). In Softwood I, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, the ITA found that several
benefit programs conferred countervailable specific subsidies on the Canadian
lumber industries (though not the stumpage programs), including regional de-
velopment programs and tax incentives. Id. at 24,160-67. The total value of all
the subsidies on softwood lumber was 0.349% ad valorem. Id. at 24,159. The
ITA declined to find the stumpage rights programs countervailable because
the benefits were not specific. Id. at 24,167. When the ITA later reversed its
decision in Certain Softwood Prods. from Can. (Softwood H), 51 Fed. Reg.
37,453 (ITA 1986) (preliminary determination), it found the stumpage subsidy
to confer a benefit of 14.542% ad valorem on softwood lumber products. Id. at
37,458. Thus the earlier Softwood I case had followed the specificity test to a
result giving protection from a very small subsidy while offering no protection
from the rather sizeable cumulative subsidy the ITA later found to exist.
98. 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (ITA 1986) (preliminary determination).
99. 662 F. Supp. 258 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
100. 48 Fed. Reg. 28,522 (ITA 1983) (final determination).
101. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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That program was ruled generally available and therefore not
countervailable. In comparison, the lumber companies in Soft-
wood II alleged that the Canadian stumpage program gave Ca-
nadian lumber producers a weighted average cost advantage of
27% on the production of lumber. 0 3 The ITA in Softwood II
found that the actual amount of the stumpage subsidy was
14.542% ad valorem.10 4 That subsidy was held specific and
therefore countervailable. Thus, the generally available pro-
grams in PPG Industries and Anhydrous and Aqua Ammonia
from Mexico, although not subject to countervailing duties, ac-
tually gave greater cost advantages than the specific subsidy
that was countervailable.
Moreover, the specific subsidy held countervailable in Soft-
wood II was relatively large compared to the small specific sub-
sidies of less than two percent that the ITA in many cases has
found countervailable. 10 5 Thus, under the current specificity
test, a United States producer may receive protection from a
subsidy of less than two percent if the subsidy is specific, but
may not obtain protection from imports benefiting from a sev-
enty-two percent cost reduction due to a generally available
government program such as the low-price sale of natural gas.
At a common sense level these results seem unfair.
The perceived inequity of the specificity test is magnified
further by the similarities between the injuries suffered by un-
successful petitioners and those claimed by successful petition-
ers. For example, the United States lumber companies, which
succeeded in their lawsuit, faced a surge of imports in the early
1980s as well as flat sales and prices in times of high demand.'0 6
103. Post Conference Brief on Behalf of Petitioner the U.S. Coalition for
Fair Lumber Imports at 40, Softwood II, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (ITA 1986) (pre-
liminary determination) (No. 731-TA-274) (available from John R. Ragosta,
Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 1775 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20006) [hereinafter Post Conference Brief].
104. Softwood II, 51 Fed. Reg. at 37,458. The fact that this figure is nearly
half what petitioners claimed suggests that figures taken from the petitioners
might be overstated. Even if the figures just calculated for PPG Industries
and the ammonia producers were cut in half, however, they would still show a
sizeable competitive threat, on par with or greater than the subsidy that the
ITA found in the Softwood II case and greater than many subsidies found
countervailable in other cases. See supra note 97.
105. See supra note 97.
106. Between 1984 and 1985 Canadian lumber imports jumped from supply-
ing 29% to 32% of the United States market. During those years Canadian
sales volume was up 10% while the sales and prices for United States firms
remained flat despite good economic conditions. Hearing on U.S.-Canadian
Trade, supra note 38, at 18 (statement of Alfred Eckes, Comm'r, ITA).
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United States float glass producers, who did not succeed on
their subsidy claim, nonetheless experienced similar conditions.
Imports of Mexican float glass products into the United States
rose dramatically during the first half of the 1980s, 10 7 while in
the middle 19 80s prices and employment among United States
float glass producers have remained flat despite increasing
demand.108
Because the specificity test is likely to continue to yield re-
sults denying United States producers protection against for-
eign governments' generally available programs that give large
advantages, while allowing protection from small specific subsi-
dies, United States producers will perceive the specificity test
as unfair in its operation. A test viewed as unfair could lead to
pressure on Congress for strongly protectionist measures, simi-
lar to the 1983 and 1985 bills proposing the elimination of the
specificity test for natural resource cases. Bills eliminating the
specificity test would invite mirror legislation from trading
partners and threaten to expose United States exports to in-
creased countervailing duties from other countries attempting
to offset the effects of United States subsidies. 0 9
The recent reaffirmation in PPG Industries of the past con-
troversial natural gas decisions evinces the lingering fairness
problem with the specificity test and points out the possibility
of renewed attack on this barrier against excessive counter-
vailing duties."10 To avoid these problems, a new standard is
needed that would be perceived as more fair while maintaining
the present rule's effectiveness as a practical limit on counter-
vailing duty actions. A standard that limited countervailing du-
107. The value of imports of float glass went up 10.8% in the period 1979-
1984, up another 27.2% in 1984-1985, and up a further 8.9% in 1985-1986. The
value of United States imports of float glass was $70.8 million in 1981 and $214
million in 1985. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ITA, U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK at
2-12 (Jan. 1987).
108. Id. at 2-10. The number of United States production workers in the
float glass industry declined 5.4% in the years 1979-1984 and remained un-
changed from 1984-1986. Id. at 2-12.
109. See supra notes 69-68 and accompanying text.
110. Several members of the House Ways and Means Committee recently
called the issue of domestic subsidies "unresolved." WAYS AND MEANS REPORT
ON H.R. 3, supra note 51, at 456. The Committee specifically called for im-
provements in the GATT "to deter, and to provide greater discipline regard-
ing, unfair trade practices .... These practices include subsidizing or dumping
of downstream materials or components, resource subsidies, displacement of
sales in third country markets through unfair practices, and export targeting."
Id. at 40.
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ties in a more economically rational manner would also benefit
the United States.
III. A NEW PRACTICAL LIMIT
Part I of this Note described the countervailing duty law as
erecting two barriers to limit the potential number of counter-
vailing duty actions against domestic subsidies. The first bar-
rier is the definition of domestic subsidy as a specific subsidy.
The second barrier is the material injury requirement.
Although the specificity test presents a formidable barrier, it
leads to politically controversial and economically unsound
results.
In theory the specificity test could be made less politically
controversial by relaxing it so that only government programs
that affected hundreds of clearly distinct industries, and thus
approached the theoretical ideal of perfect general availability,
were not considered specific subsidies. Under such a test, the
Mexican natural gas program, for example, would be consid-
ered specific if less than a significant majority of industries
used natural gas as a major input. Under a test with such a low
threshold, only subsidies to very broad-based programs, such as
education and roadbuilding, would be generally available.1 1 '
This lowered specificity test might achieve better results in
terms of perceived fairness because the broadly available pro-
grams, such as education and roadbuilding, which supporters of
the specificity test suggest are acceptable programs for govern-
ment," would not become countervailable, but the trouble-
some natural resource subsidies would give rise to
countervailing duties.
The major problem with relaxing the specificity test to
such an extent is that such a low-level test would fail to serve
as an adequate practical limit. United States industries could
potentially bring many more countervailing duty actions than
under the present regime, and foreign industries would lose no
time in pushing for a similar relaxed standard in their coun-
tries to increase protection against United States exports.1"3
111. One can speculate that education and roadbuilding affect virtually all
industries-though not equally-while natural gas subsidies benefit a large but
lesser number. Almost every industry needs educated people and a transport
system to function, while not as many use natural gas as an input. Therefore,
at some very low level, natural gas subsidies could be more specific than edu-
cation and roadbuilding subsidies.
112. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 43 (discussing problems of mirror legislation).
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Instead of relaxing the specificity test, the practical limit-
ing effect of the current test could be achieved by a new test
leaving the material injury requirement intact, but eliminating
the specificity test barrier and replacing it with a new de
minimis barrier. The proposed de minimis barrier also would
reach better results in terms of fairness and perhaps economics
as well.
A. PoLIcy ADVANTAGES OF A DE MINmns BARRIER
The policies underlying the specificity test would be better
served by replacing the present definition of subsidy under
United States countervailing duty law with a broad economic
definition of the word and restricting the possible number of
claims for protection by setting minimum quantitative limits on
the size of subsidies considered countervailable.
Instead of defining a domestic subsidy as a benefit con-
ferred by a government program on a specific industry, as
under the present law,114 the law should simply define subsidy
as a benefit conferred on an industry by a government pro-
gram, regardless of whether the program is specifically ad-
dressed to that industry or generally available. The law should,
however, treat any subsidy resulting in a certain percent reduc-
tion in the costs of manufacturing the product under investiga-
tion (five percent, for example) as de minimis and not
countervailable.115
On balance, the de minimis test would not necessarily per-
mit more successful countervailing duty actions than the speci-
ficity test. On the one hand, the numerous cases in which the
ITA found specific subsidies of two percent or less11 6 would no
longer result in countervailing duties. On the other hand, this
new rule would allow the imposition of countervailing duties
against large subsidies not countervailable under the present
specificity test. For example, under this rule the ITA could
have imposed a countervailing duty on Mexican float glass for
114. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (explaining present law's
definition of subsidy).
115. The concept of a de inimis subsidy is not foreign to present United
States countervailing duty law. In Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United
States, 517 F. Supp. 704 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981) (bicycle tires and tubes from Tai-
wan), the ITA found a net subsidy of .28%, which it held to be de minimis. Id.
at 705. The court on review held that a de minimis rule could be applied to
countervailing duty investigations. Id. at 706.
116. See supra note 97 (mentioning, among others, case in which ITA
found subsidy of 0.000% and material injury).
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its natural gas subsidy. Assuming the Mexican government
sold Mexican float glass producers natural gas at a price re-
duced by a 90% subsidy and that the natural gas made up 30%
of the input costs,117 the effective subsidy was 27% of the costs
of producing the float glass, well above the suggested de
niinis line of 5%. If the ITC also found material injury, Mex-
ico's natural gas program would become a countervailable sub-
sidy. Thus, although the de minimis test would allow
countervailing duties in different cases than the specificity test,
this test would still operate as an effective practical limit on
countervailing duty cases.
The new approach would grant or deny countervailing du-
ties in a way that would achieve results perceived as fairer than
those reached under the present specificity test. Producers de-
nied protection from a domestic subsidy below the de minimis
line would in effect be told that the subsidy its foreign competi-
tion received simply was not large enough to warrant protec-
tion. They would not be told, as under the present specificity
test, that the tremendous advantage that a foreign government
plainly conferred on their competitor was not a subsidy.1 18
These results would accord better with a popular understand-
ing of the meaning of subsidy. A United States producer argua-
bly views any action taken by a foreign government clearly
leading to a result different from what would occur under mar-
ket conditions as a subsidy.119 United States industries can
probably accept the notion that all governments interfere with
the operation of the market to a very large degree and that
therefore not all subsidies should give rise to countervailing du-
ties. They would probably complain less forcefully to Congress,
however, if the countervailing duty law protected against the
largest and most threatening subsidies, instead of the ones,
large or small, that fell inside the counterintuitive legal defini-
tion of subsidy as a specific subsidy.2 0
117. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussing holding
in PPG Indus. v. United States that Mexican natural gas program is not
subsidy).
119. See G. HUFBAUER & J. SHELTON-ERB, supra note 76, at 90 (quoting
broad market-based definition of subsidy). Even a tax can be viewed as a neg-
ative subsidy. Cf L. WInTERs, supra note 72, at 91 (subsidy is negative tax).
120. The two-part nature of the present law's definition of subsidy, see
supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text, arguably combines an intuitive defi-
nition of subsidy (a government benefit) with a legal limit on when the defini-
tion may be applied (when the benefit accrues to a specific industry). In a
give-with-one-hand-take-with-the-other approach, the definition states that
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From an economic point of view, a de minimis standard
could do no worse than the present specificity test, and it might
result in an improvement. Government programs never
achieve perfect general availability in practice, and conse-
quently virtually all subsidies cause distortions in the operation
of comparative advantage. x21 Logic would seem to suggest that
the largest subsidies cause the worst economic distortions.122
Because a de minimis test would allow the imposition of coun-
tervailing duties against the largest subsidies-as opposed to
the specificity test, which allows countervailing duties against
both large and small subsidies provided they are specific-the
de minimis test would address the worst cases of distortion.
Some scholars assert, however, that it is very difficult to
distinguish subsidies that distort trade away from the free mar-
ket ideal from subsidies that merely counteract other distor-
tions.123 If these scholars are correct, large subsidies might not
certain kinds of practices are subsidies-such as providing goods at preferen-
tial rates, providing loans or capital at terms inconsistent with commercial
considerations, granting funds, forgiving debt, or assuming costs to benefit an
industry, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982)-but only if provided to specific industries;
id. Arguably, the list of practices considered subsidies is the intuitive defini-
tion of subsidy, and the secondary requirement of specificity is a counterintui-
tive limit placed, for practical purposes, see supra notes 64-68 and
accompanying text, on the intuitive definition.
Even the CIT has observed that it defies logic to state that a government
program is not a subsidy simply because it applies to a specific industry, enter-
prise, or group thereof. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp.
1237, 1242 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). The CIT itself has occasionally used the term
subsidy when referring to a generally available benefit. See, e.g., id. at 1241
("The primary object of the law is the removal of the advantage of a subsidy
.... [The extent to which subsidization is practiced in the country of produc-
tion is immaterial."); Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F.
Supp. 834, 837 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983) (no generally available domestic subsidy
[an oxymoron] has ever been countervailed).
121. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
122. A large subsidy would tend to shift resources among industries faster
and to a greater extent than a small subsidy, therefore making a larger effect
on relative costs and export prices. See supra note 72 and accompanying text
(describing operation of comparative advantage theory).
123. Barcel6, supra note 72, at 131; Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, The Mean-
ing of "Subsidy" and "Injury" in the Countervailing Duty Law, 6 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 17, 17-18 (1986). Barcel6 argues that it is difficult to determine
which subsidies are actually inefficient and which are not. Barcel6, supra note
72, at 131. He further argues that even assuming a subsidy is not inefficient
because it merely compensates for some government-created cost, a subsidy
abroad can still cause disruptions for United States industries that face transi-
tion costs to move resources and workers out of industries declining in inter-
national competitiveness. Offsetting these costs is the benefit foreign subsidies
provide to the United States in the form of cheap imports for consumers. Id.
at 132. Barcel6 suggests that it is very difficult to determine whether the in-
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necessarily cause the worst economic distortions, because they
might simply offset other large distortions. Under this analysis
the de minimis test could lead to countervailing duties against
both distortive and nondistortive subsidies. Yet such a result
would be no worse than the results under the specificity test,
which does not impose countervailing duties against generally
available benefits that might be distortive, but allows counter-
vailing duties against specific subsidies that might not be
distortive.124
B. PROBLEMS WrTH ENACTING A DE MINIMIS TEST INTO
UNITED STATES LAW
Although a de minimis test would better meet the policies
underlying United States countervailing duty law, Congress
could not unilaterally eliminate the specificity test without
risking international legal and political opposition. Some have
argued that the specificity test is required by the language of
the GATT Subsidies Code.12 5 If the United States's trading
creased costs from the foreign subsidy outweigh the benefits of cheap imports.
Id. Barcel6 concludes from this analysis that an economic rationale does not
justify the imposition of countervailing duties against cheap imports. Rather,
he asserts, cheap imports should give rise to countervailing duties only when
they cause a high level of short-term injury that is politically unacceptable. Id.
In essence, then, Barcel6 makes a political judgment. He admits that eco-
nomics does not provide a good rationale for or against countervailing duties,
except that at some level it is better for global efficiency to have fewer subsi-
dies rather than more. Id. at 132. He allows politics to govern the decision of
when countervailing duties are desirable to deter the proliferation of subsidies
and offset injury to producers. He does not convincingly argue, however, that
his high-level injury line is a better balance among cheap imports, deterrence,
and compensation for injury than the present line. Rather, he seems to assert
that tipping the balance more toward cheap imports for consumers would be
politically desirable. The problem with his proposal is that the likely result of
such a change would be to fuel the fire of those who think American industry
receives inadequate protection from foreign subsidies. In addition, such a pas-
sive stance toward subsidies might not provide adequate deterrence.
This Note argues that the present net balance among deterrence, compen-
sation, and cheap imports should not be altered, at least insofar as that balance
is represented by the total number of successful countervailing duty actions.
Instead of altering the total number of successful countervailing duty actions,
this Note suggests changing which kinds of actions can be successful. By fo-
cusing on a de inimis test, the more controversial cases involving large subsi-
dies will give rise to countervailing duties, thereby reducing protectionist
pressure and perhaps taking care of the cases with the highest transition costs
as well.
124. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (criticizing economic ar-
gument for specificity test).
125. See supra note 44.
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partners viewed the elimination of the specificity test as a viola-
tion of international agreements, they would quickly retaliate
against United States exports. 2 6 Even if the Subsidies Code
does not require the specificity test, unilateral action on the
part of the United States to replace the test might bring retalia-
tion by its trading partners127 Even though sufficiently high de
minimis standards could prevent an increase in the total
number of countervailing duty actions successfully brought
against foreign subsidies over the number under the current
specificity test,'28 different kinds of subsidies would justify
countervailing duties under the de minimis test than under the
specificity test.129 The change in the kind of subsidy giving rise
to countervailing duties might in itself provoke other countries
to unilaterally restructure their countervailing duty laws in
ways that serve their own interests at the expense of United
States exports.
The United States could avoid the possibility of violating an
international agreement, and of touching off a vicious cycle of
increased protectionism against subsidies, by negotiating a new
rule on domestic subsidies in an international forum such as
the present round of multilateral trade negotiations taking
place under the auspices of the GATT.1 30 If the GATT member
countries agreed to set a de minimis rule for domestic subsidies,
Congress could enact it without concern for its legality under
the GATT and without fear of retaliatory legislation in other
countries.
Negotiating minimum limits for domestic subsidies within
the GATT forum would also provide the contracting parties
with the opportunity to agree to treat different kinds of subsi-
dies differently. For some products, a small cost and price ad-
vantage translates quickly into large swings in sales. For
126. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing problems of mir-
ror legislation and trade retaliation).
127. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
128. In theory a de minimis line could be drawn at a point selected so that
roughly the same number of cases did not meet the de minimis standard as did
not meet the specificity standard.
129. See supra notes 114-124 and accompanying text (discussing effects of
de minimis test).
130. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, reprinted in Results
of the GAT Ministerial Meeting Held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, United
States House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1986). The Ministerial
Declaration states that the negotiations will discuss subsidies. Id. at 21. A sep-
arate negotiating group will be established to deal with subsidy issues. Id.
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example, softwood lumber is a fungible product13' in that pine
trees from Quebec differ little qualitatively from pine trees cut
in Maine.132 Thus, if a subsidy makes Quebec lumber a little
less expensive than Maine lumber, the Maine lumber compa-
nies will quickly lose sales to Quebec companies. 133 In contrast,
for certain other products a small change in price due to a sub-
sidy will not cause purchasers to switch suppliers as quickly.
For example, the quality and chemical makeup of carbon black
feedstock can vary among producers, and a particular carbon
black plant is adapted to use the particular feedstock available
to it. 3 4 It is not as likely, therefore, that a small change in
price due to a subsidy would cause purchasers to switch to new
sources. The contracting parties could take into account these
kinds of qualitative differences among industries and products
in negotiating various de minimis limits on subsidies.
If the GATT signatories could not agree on appropriate
minimum subsidies for specific industries, they might be able to
reach agreements for certain broad categories of subsidies. The
signatories to the Subsidies Code have already agreed to treat
export subsidies differently from domestic subsidies.135 New
agreements could distinguish among domestic subsidies by set-
ting different de nini ris thresholds for different broad catego-
ries of domestic subsidies. For example, the contracting parties
might agree that research and development subsidies are par-
ticularly injurious 136 and therefore should be countervailable at
131. Post Conference Brief, supra note 103, at 43 & n.36.
132. Memorandum Concerning the Appropriateness of a Cross-Border
Stumpage Comparison to Measure the Canadian Timber Subsidy at 23-31, Cer-
tain Softwood Lumber Prods. from Can. (Softwood II), 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453
(ITA 1986) (preliminary determination) (No. C-122-602) (submitted by the Co-
alition for Fair Lumber Imports, Sept. 26, 1986, and available from John A.
Ragosta, Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 1775 Pennsylvania Ave.
N.W., Washington, D. C. 20006).
133. Post Conference Brief, supra note 103, at 43 n.36.
134. Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722, 727 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985), appeal dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539 (1986).
135. The Subsidies Code separated out export subsidies and made them
countervailable regardless of any question of specificity: "Signatories shall not
grant export subsidies on products other than certain primary products."
Supra note 4, at Art. 9(1).
136. Some scholars argue that technological innovation creates valuable
spillovers in the economy, so that if governments are able to retain more re-
search and development activities at home, they will improve the welfare of
their country at the expense of others. Paul Krugman writes,
Innovation, because it involves the generation of knowledge, is partic-
ularly likely also to generate valuable spillovers. So there is now good
reason to suspect that trade policy can be used to encourage external-
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a low level of subsidy. Similarly, the United States might press
the other members to agree to treat natural resource subsidies
separately. 137
Breaking down domestic subsidies according to groups,
however, creates the opportunity for each country to press its
own subsidy agenda. For example, although the United States
would desire a more relaxed regime for protecting against sub-
sidized natural resources, 138 many developing countries that
rely on their natural resources to drive their development ef-
forts would oppose such a relaxed regime. Similarly, some na-
tions, such as France, view government-sponsored research and
development as an important strategy to retain a strong indus-
trial base and military independence. 13 9 Such nations might op-
pose a separate treatment of government research and
development subsidies. The disparity of interests would make
difficult an agreement that any one kind of domestic subsidy
merits different status.
This problem is difficult but not insurmountable. A coun-
try might concede to some limits on its favorite subsidy in ex-
change for a similar commitment from a trading partner,
especially if the discussion focused on reducing the subsidy
without eliminating it altogether. Bargaining could take place
more easily if the countries began by agreeing to a base line de
minimis percentage applicable to all domestic subsidies and
then searched for categories in which they could "horse trade"
for lower limits. For example, France might not object to a
lower de minimis level for research and development subsidies
economy-producing activities. Suppose, for example, that we conclude
that certain high-technology sectors generate large technological spil-
lovers to the rest of the economy. We could then conclude that pro-
moting these sectors, through protection, export subsidies, and so on,
might raise national income. Conversely, foreign promotion of these
sectors might be depriving us of valuable spillovers and should be
countered, contrary to the conventional argument that free trade is
appropriate whatever other countries do.
Krugman, Introduction: New Thinking about Trade Policy, in STRATEGIC
TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 13-14 (P. Krugman
ed. 1986); see also FOREIGN AFFAIRs REPORT ON H.R. 3, supra note 76, at 62
(urging change in trade policy to counter advances in other countries).
137. Separate treatment for natural resources was the approach Congress
took in the 1983 and 1985 trade bills. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying
text.
138. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
139. Carliner, Industrial Policies for Emerging Industries, in STRATEGIC
TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 135, at
161-64.
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if the United States agreed not to object to a lower de minimis
level for subsidies related to space or defense programs.
The GATT contracting parties might agree that certain
kinds of domestic subsidies should never give rise to counter-
vailing duties and thus should not be subject to any de minimis
test. For example, government support for higher education
and government provision of physical infrastructure are subsi-
dies widely practiced in all countries. The specificity test was
developed in part to prevent the enactment of countervailing
duties against these kinds of commonly practiced subsidies.140
A simple agreement to exclude these subsidies from counter-
vailing duties would achieve this objective of the specificity test
without creating the fairness problems associated with that test
when it is applied to other kinds of subsidies, such as stumpage
subsidies, not practiced as universally as education and
roadbuilding subsidies.
CONCLUSION
The definition in United States countervailing duty law of
a subsidy as a specific subsidy limits the number of potential
countervailing duty cases against domestic subsidies. Although
the definition achieves this limiting function, it creates political
controversy because it is viewed as unfair, and it fails to combat
economic inefficiency as its supporters claim. Eliminating the
specificity test and imposing a de mininmis test would limit the
number of possible countervailing duty actions as effectively as
the present specificity rule, but this new test would do so in a
more equitable fashion, and possibly with more sensible eco-
nomic results as well. The cases falling on the noncountervail-
able side of the line would no longer be ones in which the
140. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing fairness ra-
tionale for specificity test). The ITA has been reluctant to impose counter-
vailing duties against government programs to build infrastructure, even when
the infrastructure has not been as widely available as a major interstate high-
way, for example. In Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Can., 51 Fed.
Reg. 10,041 (ITA 1986) (final determination), the ITA held that Canada's pro-
vision of small harbor facilities was not a countervailable subsidy because it
was generally available. Id. at 10,064-65. The petitioner had alleged that the
small harbors benefited only two specific industries, the commercial fishing
and recreational boating industries. The ITA found that in addition to these
industries the program affected ferries, seaplanes, tourists, commercial trans-
port vessels, and boats and ships seeking shelter from storms. Id. This made
the program generally available. See also Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi
Arabia, 51 Fed. Reg. 4206, 4210 (ITA 1986) (final determination) (infrastruc-
ture program generally available).
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complaining party faced a major threat from a foreign competi-
tor receiving a sizeable benefit from its government, such as the
PPG Industries case. Rather, noncountervailable subsidies
would be those which simply were not large enough to warrant
protection.
James D. Southwick
